Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete
Braido, Luís Henrique Bertolino
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Resumo
Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Estudo
- Ano
- 2001
- Instituição
- Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Não informado
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/12975
- Temas
- Economia
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