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Estudo

Dynamic coordination with network externalitesprocrastination can be efficient

Angeli, Deivis

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Resumo

I analyze a dynamic coordination model under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The main result is that present bias can induce a society to coordinate efficiently. When considering a transition from network A to B, higher present bias induces individuals to ask for higher relative quality of B, which is also what the central planner dictates, but for different reasons. A present biased agent overvalues relative quality because, when considering whether to initiate a transition, her momentary loss of network externalities is overvalued by myopic discounting. The planner’s motives are the negative externalities inflicted on agents 'stuck' in A during a transition.

Ficha do documento

Tipo
Estudo
Ano
2018
Instituição
Escola de Economia de São Paulo
Idioma
Inglês
Acesso
Acesso aberto
Identificador
oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/24574

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