Crise da democraciaa blindagem de tribunais com jurisdição constitucional contra ingerências do populismo autoritário

Resumo

Contemporary processes of the outbreak of authoritarian populism are marked by the rise of leaders supporting this rhetoric via suffrage, followed by the capture of institutions that promote and protect the democratic rule of law, maintaining a facade of democracy, but with a degraded democratic quality. In Hungary, Poland, Turkey and India, courts with constitutional jurisdiction, entrusted with the task of protecting the constitutional order from dismantling, were some of the main domestic targets of authoritarian populists, who proceeded with strategies to neutralize the resistance that the jurisdiction represented to their political project. In order to understand how the clash between authoritarian populist governments and courts with constitutional jurisdiction took place in these four countries, and which institutional circumstances appear to have contributed to the success or failure of shielding the jurisdiction, this thesis studies the processes of democratic transition or independence, the contexts of the rise of authoritarian populism, the tools used by the government for the intended institutional interference and the jurisdictions’ design. It is concluded that, whether through constituent processes or authoritarian constitutionalism, legalism and/or infralegalism, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and India have faced processes of capture of their courts through strategies as diverse as the imagination of authoritarian populist leaders could reach. High degrees of electoral disproportionality and the existence of predominantly parliamentary systems, as well as the absence of eternity clauses protecting the provisions on the court and the impossibility of judicial constitutionality control of constitutional amendments, proved to be conjunctural tendencies that facilitated the capture of the jurisdiction. It is suggested that the success of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court's resistance to authoritarian populism is due not only to the proportional electoral system, but also to the court's broad jurisdiction and accessibility, including for the control of constitutional amendments that violate the separation of powers, as well as the entrenchment of the jurisdictional design, the internal dispersion of powers in the court and a political dexterity in shaping the court’s agenda, making it more attractive for the government to be subject to the jurisdiction than to rebel against judicial decisions. This thesis closes with considerations on the future challenges to be faced by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, since the end of the authoritarian populist rule has not ceased the attacks on the court, now in the legislative sphere.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2024

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/35391

Palavras-chave

Populismo autoritárioTribunais com jurisdição constitucionalDireito constitucional comparadoSupremo Tribunal FederalAuthoritarian populismCourts with constitutional jurisdictionComparative constitutional lawBrazilian Federal Supreme CourtDireitoEstado de direitoPopulismoAutoritarismoDireito constitucional - BrasilBrasil. Supremo Tribunal Federal