Cournot-nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences

Resumo

In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Coumot-Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79-94; On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games, J. Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207-223; A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 437-470] to games with possibly non-ordered preferences, providing a continuum analogue of the seminal existence results by Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive preferences, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 237-246], Gale and Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 9-15], Shafer and Sonnenschein [Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 345-348], Borglin and Keiding [Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium: a note on the 'new' existence theorems, J. Math. Econ. 3 (1976) 313-316] and Yannelis and Prabhakar [Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in linear topological spaces, J. Math. Econ. 12 (1983) 233-245]. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2008

Instituição

Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1016/j.jet.2007.05.002

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23097

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

Pure Cournot-Nash equilibriumContinuum gamesNon-ordered preferencesFeeble topologyMeasure spaceCommodity spaceAbstract economiesAnonymous gamesEconomiaEquilíbrio econômico