Contingent judicial deferencetheory and application to usury laws

Resumo

Legislation that seems unreasonable to courts is less likely to be followed. Building on this premise, we propose a model and obtain two main results. First, the enactment of legislation prohibiting something raises the probability that courts will allow related things not expressly forbidden. In particular, the imposition of an interest rate ceiling can make it more likely that courts will validate contracts with interest rates below the legislated cap. Second, legal uncertainty is greater with legislation that commands little deference from courts than with legislation that commands none. We discuss examples of e§ects of legislated prohibitions (and, in particular, usury laws) that are consistent with the model.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Estudo

Ano

2017

Instituição

Escola de Economia de São Paulo

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/17985

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

AdjudicationCourtsProhibitionsInterest rate capEconomiaDeferência (Direito)Taxas de juros Usura (Direito)