Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiencyan experimental investigation into voting behavior

Resumo

This article reports results from an economic experiment that investigates to what extent voters punish corruption and waste in elections. While both are responsible for a loss of welfare for voters, they are not necessarily perceived as equally immoral. The empirical literature in political agency has not yet dealt with these two dimensions that determine voters’ choices. Our results suggest that morality and norms are indeed crucial for a superior voting equilibrium in systems with heterogeneous politicians: while corruption is always punished, self-interest alone – in the absence of norms – leads to the acceptance and perpetuation of waste and social losses.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Outro

Ano

2016

Instituição

EAESP - Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/17777

Temas

Governança

Palavras-chave

CorruptionWasteElectionsExperimentAdministração de empresasVotoEleiçõesCorrupção - Investigação