Career concernsa human capital perspective

Resumo

We introduce human capital accumulation, in the form of learning by doing, in a life cycle model of career concerns and analyze how human capital acquisition a ects implicit incentives for performance. We show that standard results from the career concerns literature can be reversed in the presence of human capital accumulation. Namely, implicit incentives need not decrease over time and may decrease with the degree of uncertainty about an individual's talent. Furthermore, increasing the pre-cision of output measurement can weaken rather than strengthen implicit incentives. Overall, our results contribute to shed new light on the ability of markets to discipline moral hazard in the absence of explicit contracts linking pay to performance.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Estudo

Ano

2012

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/10002

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

Career concernsHuman capitalReputationEconomiaProfissõesCapital humano