Applying a third party access model for China's gas pipeline networkan independent pipeline operator and congestion rent transfer

Resumo

This paper investigates third party access regulatory issues in China's natural gas industry. We study the development of China's gas market-oriented reform and how third party access becomes a pressing issue in that context. This paper aims to report stakeholders' benefit and distributional effects during a hypothetical third party access process. To that end, we apply an oligopolistic equilibrium model, based on the mixed complementarity problem, to China's gas pipeline network. We compare two scenarios: a scenario without third party access and the other scenario where an independent pipeline operator optimizes flows. This latter scenario aims to guarantee that the maximum social benefit is achieved. In addition, the latter scenario transfers the congestion rent to former integrated gas companies to compensate their actual loss control of the pipeline operation, in order to minimize the adverse distributional effects for pipeline companies. The solution of the model indicates that operational separation is feasible with Pareto improvement in China's context. Moreover, it merits particular attention from policy makers in China that pipeline capacity scarcity should be properly evaluated and managed.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2017

Instituição

Springer

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1007/s11149-017-9316-z

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23731

Temas

EconomiaDesenvolvimento Econômico

Palavras-chave

Third party accessMixed complementarity problemCongestion rent transferIndependent pipeline operatorChina's gas marketEconomiaGás natural - IndústriaGasodutos