Agenda power, executive decree authority, and the mixed results of reform in the Brazilian Congress

Resumo

This article examines how institutional change in the use of extraordinary legislation affects delegation of power and unilateral action in new democracies. From 1988 to 2001, Brazilian presidents were able to reissue decrees indefinitely and thus had substantial legislative power. In 2001, Congress amended the constitution so as to restrict the president to a single reissue of each lapsed decree. This reform has had mixed results: although it ended the practice of infinite reissues, it induced Presidents Cardoso and Lula to use more decrees than previous executives had. Presidential agenda power, rather than being reduced, has been sharpened. By analyzing patterns of presidential initiatives from 1995 to 2005, we demonstrate the mixed results of this constitutional reform.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2008

Instituição

Comparative Legislative Res Center

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.3162/036298008783743309

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23094

Palavras-chave

Police patrolsFire alarmsOversightCiência políticaReforma legislativa - Brasil